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Summary
In this paper, the authors provide an analysis of the ethical issues surrounding 
the transplantation of organs from animals into humans. The main objections 
to xenotransplantation relate to safety concerns for the recipient; public health 
concerns about new viruses spreading from animals to humans; the possibility 
of animals developing human features; concerns about human dignity; and the 
fact that animals must be sacrificed so humans can benefit from their organs. 
Despite these objections, the urgency of the organ shortage situation is such 
that xenotransplantation may be justified, if further advances make it a realistic 
possibility.
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Introduction
Despite the increasing number of people worldwide 
changing from eating meat to vegetarianism and veganism, 
billions of people eat non-human animals every day. In 
developed countries, eating meat is no longer necessary 
to achieve adequate nutritional intake, therefore meat 
consumption is harder to justify than it was in the past 
when maintaining a balanced diet was more challenging. 
But there is another potential use of animals that may be 
easier to justify: as sources of organs to transplant into 
humans.
The number of people who need a new organ is increasing 
every day. Most countries have highly developed organ 
donation and transplantation systems in place and 
stage frequent high-profile campaigns to promote organ 
donation from both living donors and deceased patients. 
Nevertheless, in spite of these Herculean efforts, and 
the consequent increase in donation rates, waiting lists 
for organs continue to grow because supply is still not 
adequate to meet demand. The result is that hundreds 
of patients die worldwide every day while waiting for an 
organ – and thousands more continue to suffer on dialysis 
while waiting for a kidney. In the United Kingdom alone, 
two or three people die every day waiting for an organ (1). 
Several specific strategies have been suggested to increase 
donation rates and thus transplantation rates. The number 
of donations could be increased if fewer families refused 
to permit donations from their deceased relatives, but 
this issue is challenging due to the difficulty in discussing 
organ donation with bereaved or soon to be bereaved 
family members (2). Several countries have moved to 
so-called ‘opt-out’ systems, where consent for donation is 
presumed (or ‘deemed’) (3), but the issue of family refusal 
can actually be made worse by such legal changes (4). 
Several types of incentive have been suggested to increase 
donation rates. In the case of living donations, those in 
need of organs, and their families and friends, increasingly 
use social media to plead for an altruistic donation, but 
many are unsuccessful.
In order to help to meet the demand for organs, scientists 
and doctors have been trying for decades to transplant 
organs from animals into humans – or to perform 
xenotransplantation, to use the technical term. In this 
article, the authors explore the ethical issues raised by 
traditional xenotransplantation, the use of genetically 
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modified animals for xenotransplantation, and the more 
recent possibility of so-called ‘chimaera organs’: human 
organs created from the intended recipient’s stem cells 
and grown inside other animals (most probably pigs). 
Each of these types of xenotransplantation raises its own 
ethical issues, but each successive type has also solved 
some of the problems with the previous ‘generation’ of 
xenotransplantation. Broadly speaking, the main ethical 
issues concern the risk to recipients themselves, the risk to 
the public (public health concerns) and the harm done to 
animals by xenotransplantation. Some commentators have 
also voiced concerns relating to human dignity.
Xenotransplantation
The simplest form of xenotransplantation – though it is 
far from a simple procedure – is to remove organs from 
an animal and transplant them into a human. The term is 
defined as ‘any procedure that involves the transplantation, 
implantation, or infusion into a human recipient of either 
live tissues or organs retrieved from animals, or, human 
body fluids, cells, tissue or organs that have undergone 
ex vivo contact with live non-human animal cells, tissues or 
organs’ (5). Xenotransplantation was first attempted in the 
1960s, and the most salient ethical issue quickly became 
apparent: organs from animals are even more likely to be 
rejected than those donated by humans. Because donor 
organs (whatever the source) are alien to the recipient’s 
body, his or her immune system will almost always react 
negatively to the new organ(s) and attempt to reject it. Even 
patients who successfully undergo organ transplantation 
will have to keep taking immunosuppressant drugs for 
the rest of their lives. However, when the organ is taken 
(‘donated’ hardly seems appropriate) from an animal, 
immunosuppressants are unlikely to be effective because 
the organ is from a different species. 
In the first attempts at xenotransplantation, it was 
quickly discovered that organs from animals are very 
swiftly rejected when transplanted into a human. Kidneys 
from chimpanzees were transplanted into six patients 
in the United States of America in 1964 – this species 
was chosen because of its close genetic relationship to 
humans, but the organs were rejected and all but one 
patient died within days (though the latter survived for nine 
months). In the same year, baboon kidneys were transplanted 
into six patients, none of whom survived longer than two 
months. In three other cases (a baboon heart and two 
baboon livers) in the 1980s and 1990s, the recipients all died 
within 100 days of transplantation. In terms of 
transplantation from other types of animal, one patient 
received a sheep heart in 1968 and died immediately, and 
one received a pig heart in 1992 and died within a day (6). 
These grim statistics led to the first efforts to genetically 
modify animals to decrease the chances of rejection (see 
next section).
Xenotransplantation of solid organs would only ever be 
considered for patients who ‘super-urgently’ needed an 
organ, because the risk of death involved in receiving 
a transplant would be too high for those who can afford 
to wait longer in the hope of receiving an organ from 
a human donor. Of course, if the alternative to trying 
xenotransplantation is death from organ failure, the 
very slim chance of successful transplantation without 
rejection is likely to appeal to patients. However, even for 
this small group of patients, there is another reason why 
xenotransplantation might be problematic, as discussed 
below.
The other major ethical issue affecting xenotransplantation 
concerns the potential consequences if the organ is not 
rejected: the transplant could result in the transmission 
of an existing animal virus to its human host, or (worse) 
interaction between the animal organ and its human host 
could create a new virus that could then cause a pandemic of 
infection. This risk of ‘zoonosis’ makes xenotransplantation 
an issue not only of individual consent and risk, but also of 
public health ethics. This means that the consequences of 
xenotransplantation not only affect the recipient (and the 
animal from which the organ is taken) but also the wider 
public. As Sheila McLean and Laura Williamson describe: 
‘The risks of infectious disease potentially associated with 
xenotransplantation mean that the decision of one patient 
could compromise the health of third parties: their close 
contacts, healthcare providers or others’ (7). Because of 
these concerns, monitoring for infectious disease following 
xenotransplantation might not only apply to the recipient 
of the organ, but also to anyone in frequent contact with 
him or her in order to prevent any small but potentially 
catastrophic risk of a pandemic from being realised. This 
in turn raises some ethical issues regarding the possibly 
coercive nature of any such monitoring; a person might 
want to receive a xenotransplant, but consent should also 
be sought from his or her family members if they must 
submit to long-term monitoring for any zoonosis. Any 
patient who was not willing to consent to such monitoring 
would have to be excluded from any xenotransplantation 
research, and the same would apply if their family members 
and any other close intimates were not also willing to be 
monitored. 
Finally, some conservative commentators objected to 
the original attempts at xenotransplantation because 
they regarded it as contrary to human dignity to insert 
parts of animals into human bodies, even to preserve life. 
This is because many religious views hold that human 
kind is a special type of animal (or not an animal at all) 
and this distinction should not be blurred by cross-species 
mixing of any sort. This view is illustrated well by the 
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official Catholic Church statement on xenotransplantation: 
‘From our point of view, supported by the biblical 
perspective that asserts, as stated above, that man is created 
“in the image and likeness of God” (cf. Gen 1: 26-27), we 
reaffirm that humans have a unique and higher dignity’ (8). 
However, even the Catholic Church now acknowledges that 
xenotransplantation is ethically permissible (8), though it 
has some concerns about more recent developments in the 
field (see below). 
Despite the relative lack of success during the initial 
attempts at xenotransplantation, it is important to bear in 
mind that solid organs are not the only parts of animals 
that can be transplanted into humans. Despite the fact 
that the xenotransplantation of solid organs has not been 
successful, other parts of animals have been transplanted 
with some success. Many patients suffering from heart 
disease have had pig heart valves transplanted into their 
chests, with high success rates. Pigskin has also been used 
successfully in burns victims without any evidence of 
zoonosis occurring.
Transgenic animals and 
chimaera organs
Given the failure of traditional xenotransplantation to 
provide viable organs, the focus has shifted over the last 
few decades towards genetically modifying animals and the 
organs obtained from them that are less likely to be rejected 
following transplantation. Although the use of genetically 
modified (GM) animals for organ production does appear 
promising in terms of reducing rejection rates, it raises 
one other ethical issue not encountered by traditional 
xenotransplantation: by definition, it involves GM, which 
some object to on moral grounds. The aforementioned 
human dignity argument resurfaced when transgenic 
animals were suggested as a source of organs. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that people who objected to the mere 
transplantation of an animal organ into a human would 
also object to the addition of human genes to an animal. 
However, these concerns do not have a sound foundation. 
As the Academy of Medical Sciences put it:
‘It has long been accepted that the dignity of man does not 
rule out many ways in which animal and human materials 
are combined. After all, most humans eat meat or drink 
milk. Of course, some people are vegans on moral grounds, 
but these grounds are not that the very idea of combining 
human and animal materials is wrong, but that it is wrong 
to kill animals for human consumption, that dairy farming 
is exploitative and so on. Again, humans are not demeaned 
by the incorporation of parts of non-human animals (such 
as heart valves from pigs) through xenotransplantation, 
though it is possible to object to this practice on other 
grounds. Similarly, therefore, the creation by another form 
of xenotransplantation of animals, which include significant 
human elements, cannot be held to threaten human dignity 
just because it humanises the animals involved’ (9).
Using genetically modified animals for xenotransplantation 
remains a promising potential future source of organs, 
particularly given recent advances such as CRISPR/Cas9 
(Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic 
Repeats-associated protein-9 nuclease), a gene-editing 
technique that greatly increases scientists’ ability to alter 
genetic code accurately and that may reduce the risk of 
zoonosis further still (10). However, transgenic animals are 
still not at the stage where clinical trials are a possibility. In 
recent years, therefore, the focus has moved on to another, 
newer biotechnology: the creation of human organs inside 
animals for transplantation purposes, or so-called chimaera 
organs. To some people, transplanting animal organs into 
humans already seems like science fiction, and tinkering 
with the genetic code of animals in order to facilitate this 
endeavour even more so. Chimaera organs add induced 
pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) to the mix. 
Although the technique has not yet been attempted 
in humans, scientists have successfully taken stem cells 
from one species (a mouse) and, by modifying these cells 
and injecting them into the embryo of another mutant 
species (a rat), have succeeded in growing a mouse pancreas 
inside a rat. Without these mouse cells, the genetically 
modified rat would have been born without a pancreas. 
What is the relevance of this experiment for humans? In 
the near future, a patient who needs a new kidney could 
provide a few skin cells to scientists who would then induce 
these cells back into their pluripotent state, in which they 
can become several different types of cell. The cells would 
then be inserted into a modified embryo of a suitable species 
(probably a pig; possibly a non-human primate), and that 
embryo would then develop and gestate normally – except 
for the fact that its kidneys would be almost entirely human, 
both genetically and in terms of tissue. Once the piglet 
had been born and had grown sufficiently, the kidney(s) 
could be removed and transplanted into the intended 
recipient. It might appear that this is not xenotrans 
plantation because the organ itself is human. However, the 
term xenotransplantation refers to the source, rather than 
the nature, of an organ. This means that chimaera organs 
are a new type of xenotransplantation.
The main advantage offered by chimaera organs is that 
they would entirely avoid the issue of rejection faced by 
other forms of xenotransplantation because the organ 
would be human, not animal (11). Indeed, it would not 
only be human, but also composed of the recipient’s 
own DNA – meaning that recipients of chimaera organs 
would probably not even have to take any immuno 
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suppressant drugs. It seems counter-intuitive that organs 
grown inside an animal would be less likely to be rejected 
than those donated from a human, but that is the unusual 
nature of chimaera organs. 
Zoonosis should also be minimised by using chimaera 
organs. Owing to the fact that the organ being transplanted 
is human, not porcine (or some other species), the already 
low risk of zoonosis will be reduced even further. However, 
it is important to bear in mind that, even if the risk of 
zoonosis is almost zero, safety assessment focuses not only 
on the magnitude of the risk, but also the magnitude of 
the consequences if that risk is realised. In other words, 
it might be true that the zoonosis is extremely unlikely 
to ever occur, but that millions of people could die in a 
pandemic if it did occur. To guard against any such 
consequences, patients receiving chimaera organs would 
be extremely closely monitored to avoid any public health 
emergencies. However, while it might address these issues, 
such monitoring can raise new questions about privacy (see 
above). As mentioned above, the use of CRISPR/Cas9 gene 
editing may reduce the risk of zoonosis further still (12).
Another ethical issue common to transgenic animals 
and chimaera organs is the theoretical possibility that 
introducing human DNA into an animal embryo could lead 
to the creation of an actual chimaera organism – such as a 
pig with physical or mental human features, or with human 
gametes. This is a very remote possibility, as genes for these 
particular traits can be ‘knocked out’ using existing genetic 
technologies. Creating chimaera organs may run a slightly 
higher risk of these unintended effects than that involved 
in creating transgenic animals because human stem cells 
are being inserted into an animal embryo, but the risk 
remains low – and even if it were realised, the consequences 
would not be serious. For example, ‘even if human neurons 
were present in a pig brain, it is likely that they would act 
like pig neurons, being influenced by their environment 
rather than their genomic makeup’ (11). Finally, in view 
of the possibility of chimaeras having human gametes, any 
concerns about human or hybrid embryos developing in 
animal wombs can be avoided by preventing those animals 
from mating.
An additional, related objection often raised in relation to 
chimaera organs is yet another version of the claim that 
mixing human and animal DNA is contrary to human 
dignity (13). Specifically, some religious commentators 
have argued against the creation of chimaeras that ‘species 
integrity is ultimately defined by God, rather than by 
physical features. The fusion of human and nonhuman 
genomes may therefore be perceived as running counter to 
the sacredness of human life and humanity created in the 
image of God’ (14). To some people of faith, such arguments 
may have some appeal, but to non-believers, they tend to 
seem unconvincing. The creation of chimaera organs for 
transplantation raises no new threats to human dignity 
that are not also present for transgenic animals. Indeed, 
many humans would argue that it displays a lack of dignity 
to claim a special dignity for humans – especially when 
humans treat other animals with such a lack of dignity. 
This finally leads to the ethical issue common to all types of 
xenotransplantation: the cost to animals.
Exploiting animals for 
xenotransplantation
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, there is one ethical 
issue intrinsic to all three forms of xenotransplantation 
discussed in this article: the fact that using non-human 
animals to produce organs for humans harms those 
animals. Any research into xenotransplantation must 
involve by definition the use and normally the destruction 
of animals (because animal welfare legislation requires the 
euthanasia of all animals used in experiments, even those 
that could potentially survive – to avoid distress). Animal 
research is governed by the ‘Three Rs’: replacing, reducing 
and refining the use of animals in research (15). The Three 
Rs themselves are subject to two criteria: proportionality 
and subsidiarity. The former of these means that the use 
of animals must be justified by any prospective benefit, 
and the latter means that this benefit cannot be attained 
in some other, less ethically problematic way. The use of 
animals in xenotransplantation research could probably 
be justified because xenotransplantation will save lives 
if it reaches the clinic – and for comparison, animals are 
sacrificed for research that is much less likely to save lives. 
It should be noted that it is not just the animals from which 
organs are taken that are sacrificed in xenotransplantation 
research – before organs can be transplanted into humans, 
other animals must be the test recipients, and most 
transgenic pig transplant work involves transplantation into 
primates (10).
However, if any type of xenotransplantation was perfected 
and began to be used routinely in humans, this might be 
regarded as more ethically problematic because it would 
involve the systematisation of creating and killing non-
human animals in order to save human lives. In addition, 
it is important to note that any such development would 
represent a new type of use for animals – not for meat 
consumption, research or clothing, but as a source of organs 
for humans. Although the Three Rs are intended to govern 
research, whether the use of animals for this purpose would 
meet the criteria of proportionality and subsidiarity can still 
be considered. 
In the context of a world where animals are unnecessarily 
killed in their millions every day for human consumption, 
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using pigs as a source of lifesaving organs is comparatively 
easy to justify in terms of proportionality. With regard to 
subsidiarity, using pigs as an organ source is also justifiable, 
because, despite the fact that some organs are available 
from humans, there are not sufficient numbers of them 
to meet the demand. But what if it transpired that pigs 
were not a suitable model, and that primates had to be used 
instead? Primates are still sometimes used for research, but 
the rationale for this use is that they are the most suitable 
candidates for promising therapies for use in humans, and 
a condition of their use is that they will be used only in 
limited numbers. The first of these points would also apply 
in the case of chimaera organs, as the organ will save a life, 
but the second point would not, as ‘industrialising’ the use 
of primates for the production of organs would increase the 
number of primates being sacrificed. Nonetheless, given 
the prospective benefits to humans, this increased sacrifice 
might be deemed proportional – for lesser primates, though 
perhaps not for great apes, which are now treated as 
persons in some countries. (Even if greater moral value is 
accorded to primates than to pigs, substantially greater 
value is still accorded to humans.) If the subsidiarity 
criterion is met for pigs, it can also be assumed that it is met 
for primates, as here the question is not whether the benefit 
justifies using them for this purpose, but whether there 
is any alternative source of organs. As the authors have 
suggested elsewhere, ‘another interesting issue concerning 
subsidiarity arises from the possibility that creating organs 
inside pigs might be workable but less effective than using 
primates’ (16). If this were the case, it would probably 
not be possible to meet the subsidiarity criterion for using 
primates, as pigs would provide another, more ethically 
acceptable, source.
Finally, this paper should also consider the ethics of 
using animals to produce organs in a more objective 
sense. A thought experiment is useful here: consider the 
introduction of widespread xenotransplantation in a world 
where everyone is vegetarian or vegan. In such a society, 
where animals are not instrumentalised in the same way 
as they are in most countries today, it seems unlikely that 
xenotransplantation of any type – even the ‘best’ solution 
possibly offered by chimaera organs – would meet with 
public endorsement. This in turn suggests that the seeming 
permissibility of chimaera organs (and other types of 
transplantation) is largely due to status quo bias. Furthermore, 
even if xenotransplantation is considered to be morally 
acceptable under certain conditions, humans still have a 
responsibility to try to find other solutions for the scarcity 
of organs for transplantation, such as in vitro culture of 
tissue and organs, artificial organs, and organ printing (11). 
If such techniques are successfully developed, it is likely that 
neither the proportionality nor the subsidiarity conditions 
for xenotransplantation would be met.
Conclusions
Xenotransplantation is a promising biotherapy that has 
not yet borne fruit (17). Given that there are no strong 
ethical arguments against using the technology (based on 
current attitudes to animals and the absence of any viable 
alternative sources in addition to human donors), it is 
possible that clinical trials of xenotransplantation using 
transgenic animals or chimaera organs will take place in 
the next decade. If these trials are successful, hundreds 
of thousands of people could benefit from receiving new 
organs. However, if they do, it will come at a considerable 
cost; for each person who benefits, at least one animal 
must die. 
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Questions éthiques suscitées par la transplantation chez l’homme 
d’organes provenant d’animaux
Cuestiones éticas en torno al trasplante de órganos animales 
al ser humano
D. Shaw, W. Dondorp & G. de Wert
Résumé
Les auteurs analysent les questions éthiques suscitées par la transplantation 
chez l’homme d’organes provenant d’animaux. Les principales objections contre 
la xénotransplantation se réfèrent aux risques pour la santé du receveur, aux 
problèmes de santé publique liés à une éventuelle propagation chez l’homme de 
virus émergents d’origine animale, au risque que des animaux acquièrent des 
caractéristiques humaines, au respect de la dignité humaine et à la nécessité 
de sacrifier des animaux pour que des êtres humains puissent bénéficier 
de leurs organes. Malgré ces objections, le déficit d’organes est tel que la 
xénotransplantation pourrait se justifier à condition que les avancées scientifiques 
en garantissent la faisabilité à l’avenir.
Mots-clés
Animal – Cellule – Cellule souche – Éthique – Modifications génétiques – Recherche – 
Xénotransplantation.
D. Shaw, W. Dondorp & G. de Wert
Resumen
Los autores proponen un análisis de las cuestiones éticas que rodean el 
trasplante de órganos animales al ser humano. Las principales objeciones que 
suscita el xenotrasplante tienen que ver con: la preocupación por la seguridad 
del receptor; la problemática de salud pública ligada a la eventual propagación 
de nuevos virus que pasen de los animales al ser humano; la posibilidad de que los 
animales adquieran atributos humanos; consideraciones vinculadas a la dignidad 
humana; y el hecho de que haya que sacrificar a animales para que los humanos 
se beneficien de sus órganos. Pese a todas estas objeciones, la urgencia de 
la situación de penuria de órganos es de tal magnitud que los xenotrasplantes 
podrían estar justificados si se sigue progresando lo bastante como para hacer 
de ellos una perspectiva realista.
Palabras clave
Animal – Célula – Célula madre – Ética – Investigación – Modificación genética – 
Xenotrasplante.
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